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Abstract
SSpeech given at Session 3: Challenge Facing Resource Development. Mr. Adams high-
lighted the dominant strategic themes that he believes will characterize the natural resource in-
dustry as we enter the new century. It should be a period of solid underlying growth for mineral
demand, although he added that periodic interruptions reflecting the usual cycles in the world
economy will occur. Against this market background, the industry will be dealing with a number
of unresolved issues from the late twentieth century, of which the taxation of economic rents, the
cost-effectiveness of environmental regulations, and the impact of privatization and deregulation
on the competitive cost structure of the industry appear to be the most important. He believes that
the companies that correctly understand and manage these issues will be more likely to succeed
than those who do not.
DOMINANT STRATEGIC THEMES OF THE
NATURALRESOURCE INDUSTRY
Robin G. Adams*
It is an honor to have been invited to address this fiftieth
annual conference of the International Bar Association. An oc-
casion such as this is an appropriate one to reflect upon the ma-
jor themes of the political economy that have influenced the nat-
ural resources sector over the past fifty years and, more impor-
tantly, to try to anticipate what may lie ahead.
Mining is the most political of industries. In many countries
around the world, the ownership of undeveloped mineral re-
sources is vested in the government at some level. The public
perceives mining as the removal of a finite, non-replaceable re-
source and, historically, this perception has been used to justify
special taxation arrangements and a high level of regulation of
the industry and its affairs. Because of this high political profile,
I will begin with a quick review of the official way in which the
thinking about this industry has developed over the last half cen-
tury.
.I. HISTORICAL TRENDS
From the end of World War II until approximately 1960, the
structure of the industry was that major companies located in
industrial countries exploited natural resources from their own
countries and their colonies, former colonies, or, in the case of
the United States, closely allied countries. The main goal of gov-
ernment action in that period was firstly to remove war-time con-
trols as soon as possible; secondly, to promote the reconstruction
of physical facilities from the damage experienced in World War
II; and, thirdly, to ensure that adequate materials would be avail-
able for any future national emergency. In other words, govern-
ments actively promoted the growth and expansion of the indus-
try.
Beginning in about 1.960, a fundamental change took place.
Decolonization in the Third World and the spread of the welfare
state in the industrial countries created an environment in which
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the view was taken that natural resources should be regulated so
that a significant portion of the economic rent available from
these resources would be captured by the public sector. This
thinking resulted in policies such as the nationalization of, or
compulsory government participation in, foreign-owned mining
companies in Third World countries and aggressive tax regimes
to capture economic rent. This was not just a Third World prob-
lem. It happened to a lesser extent in such countries as Austra-
lia, Canada, and part of Europe. However, it was worse in the
Third World. The result was that, regardless of geological poten-
tial, much of the world became increasingly unattractive for min-
eral exploration and development.
The oil crisis of 1973/74 ushered in another major change
in thinking. It popularized the theory, developed by the so-
called "Club of Rome,"' that the world was gradually running
out of natural resources. Oil was simply the first of many com-
modities where major price increases were inevitable. The deter-
mination of governments in producing countries to capture eco-
nomic rents was, thus, reinforced sharply. In addition, there was
now the desire to actively manage the production side of the
industry in order to bring forward these price increases. The
bauxite-producing countries actually copied the oil-producing
countries in imposing massive new taxes. The copper-producing
countries tried to promote a more activist, OPEC-type 2 role for
their intergovernmental organization, CIPEC.' The tin produ-
cers used their voting power in the long established Interna-
tional Tin Council ("ITC") to raise floor prices significantly in
real terms by treating newly-imposed taxes as "costs" requiring
price increases.
The major assumptions underlying such policies turned out
to be completely wrong. The world was not running out of re-
1. See GARETH PORTER &JANET WELSH BROWN, The Emergence of Global Environmental
Politics, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 23-25 (1996) (discussing 1972 "Limits to
Growth" study by Club of Rome, which suggested economic development and popula-
tion growth would strain earth's carrying capacity resulting in depletion of natural re-
sources and degradation of ecosystems).
2. See 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAM & CRiLES J. MEYERs, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 757
(1995) (discussing formation and purpose of OPEC ("Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries")).
3. See George P. Tateosian, Copper Industry is Still Changing, AMERICAN METAL MAR-
KET, Feb. 6, 1990, at 10 (discussing activist role of CIPEC ("Council of Copper Export-
ing Countries") in production and sale of world copper mines).
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sources. Although mining companies in some sectors were ex-
ploiting lower ore grades at new mines, this mostly reflected the
fact that the richest ore bodies were locked away in countries
that were now too hostile to be acceptable for private sector ex-
ploration and development.
Worse still, the impact of the oil price increases in 1973/74,
and again in 1979/80, on the world economy was to trigger sig-
nificant recessions which reduced metals demand in the short
term. Instead of increasing, metal prices fell - in some cases
very sharply. Instead of the expected financial bonanza, state-
run mining companies began to experience losses, and because
of the political constraints on their operating decisions they were
slower and less aggressive than their private sector competitors
in adjusting to these new circumstances.
II. RETHINKING THE FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS
The historian John Lukcas wrote that the twentieth century
began in 1914 and ended in 1989. It is that year which I pick as
the next decisive political watershed in the affairs of the natural
resources industry. By 1989, there was virtually no government
left anywhere in the world believing that mineral extraction was
an abnormally profitable undertaking that could be tapped as a
cash cow for public financial purposes. Instead, it had been
identified as a sector that was fundamentally unsuitable for pub-
lic investment. It is characterized by high price volatility leading
to unstable earning flows. It involves high risk exploration activi-
ties, significant environmental management problems, and,
above all, is a highly capital-intensive sector which cannot prop-
erly be financed by heavily indebted governments.
The key events that led to this radical change in perception
were the following:
1. The post-1980 determination by governments in the in-
dustrial countries to act decisively to break inflationary
expectations caused a recession-induced collapse in re-
source prices and fatally wounded the notion that real as-
sets were a safer bet than financial assets.
2. The collapse of the oil price in the mid-1980s showed that
markets, if allowed to work, would eventually induce sup-
pliers and consumers to modify their behavior and break-
even the strongest cartel. The collapse of the Interna-
THEMES OF NATURAL RESOURCE 1NDUSTRY
tional Tin Council several years later reinforced this
message.
3. The example of Chile, which opened its mining industry
to foreign private capital in the early-1980s and actively.
encouraged new entrants, where, by the mid-1980s, an ex-
ploration boom was in progress. By the late-1980s,
projects to double Chile's mining capacity were under
construction, which presented a vivid contrast to the stag-
nant mining industries in most other Latin American
countries.
4. The collapse of the planned economies of the CIS and
Eastern Europe was the final psychological blow. It is in-
teresting to note that the proximate cause of the at-
tempted coup against President Gorbachev at this time
was the imminent ratification of a new Union Treaty be-
tween the various Soviet Republics, the most important
provision of which was to transfer ownership of mineral
resources form the central government to the Republics,
thereby providing them with independent access to inter-
national purchasing power.
The radical transformation in attitudes in the second-half of
the 1980s has produced a situation in the 1990s where virtually
all countries with significant mineral potential have now re-
formed their regulatory and tax regimes and are actively encour-
aging new mineral development. Suddenly, the world has be-
come much larger. Much of the geological potential locked
away for nearly a generation is being made available to meet the
needs of the twenty-first century.
III. THEMES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A. The Asian Miracle
This brings us to the future. The first and most obvious de-
velopment that will affect these industries is the Asian Miracle.4
It is clear that the countries of South and East Asia have reached
the point of economic take-off, equivalent to where Japan was
forty years ago. Just as Japan drove world natural resources de-
mand between 1955 and 1973, the Asian countries will almost
certainly exert a similar influence on the markets over the pe-
4. See WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH REPORT, THE EAST AsiAN MIA-
CLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1993) (generally defining "Asian Mira-
cle" as sustained high growth rates attained by East Asian economies).
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riod to 2015. Although India and China have average per capita
incomes well below the level of about US$2,500 which appears to
be the trigger for such a take off, the averages are misleading.
The emerging Indian middle-class numbers at least 100 million
people and has the entrepreneurial and intellectual basis for
such development. India is, for example, already in the top five
countries worldwide in the production of computer software.
The same comment can be made of China, which is really
two distinct economies - a booming outward-looking coastal re-
gion whose prospects will be greatly enhanced by a successful
return of Hong Kong, and a relatively backward and impover-
ished interior.
From the perspective of the natural resources industries,
these developments are of enormous importance, principally be-
cause of the impact that they will have on demand for metals
and minerals of all kinds. In fact, the underlying rate of growth
or world demand for many key metals like aluminum, copper,
and nickel has already begun to accelerate, although, for the
past five years, this accelerating trend has been masked by a
sharp decline in demand from the former Communist countries.
This is obviously a one-time event that reflects a major structural
adjustment in these countries. Once it is complete, which may
be very soon indeed, the underlying strength of demand will be-
gin to exert a very positive influence on these industries.
B. Economic Rents
The second point that I would like to make is that the issue
of economic rent has not gone away, although it is true that most
governments have backed off from the nearly confiscatory tax
and royalty regimes that they applied to extractive industries in
the 1965-1985 period. Three important Latin American coun-
tries - Chile, Mexico, and Peru - have even gone so far as to
eliminate all royalties or production taxes on the minerals indus-
tries. However, it is still the case that natural resource-based op-
erations are treated differently from normal property rights, and
that mining operations are fundamentally captive to specific lo-
cations in a way that most other businesses are not.
Very occasionally, the mineral exploration people still strike
the proverbial "elephant" - a deposit so rich that its potential
production costs, including a normal return on all past and fu-
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ture capital investment, result in a cost structure that is far below
any probable market price scenario. The resulting windfall
profit can be truly remarkable. The most recent noteworthy ex-
ample is the Voisey's Bay nickel deposit, the rights to which after
discovery, but before any significant capital expense had been
incurred, were sold to Inco for over US$3 billion. It is stretching
credulity to believe that in such circumstances the host govern-
ments will not try to share in such windfalls over and beyond the
normal income taxes. After all, unlike oil and gas concessions,
which are often auctioned so that the competitive market place
puts a value on the mineral rights, mineral exploration conces-
sions are typically made available for fairly nominal administra-
tive fees.
I am sure that you have all heard of the infamous Bre-X
gold mine in Indonesia which was said to contain US$21 billion
in resource value. It is a pity that public attention is focusing on
what we now know to be the fraudulent assay results. What is
deserving of more attention is the activities of rival factions in
the Indonesian governing elite as they aligned themselves with
rival "senior" mining companies, Freeport and Barrack, to mus-
cle in on what they obviously though was the massive economic
rent available in this project.
The measurement of economic rent is extremely complex
even when undertaken on a purely objective basis. Overtaxing
economic rent very quickly destroys the market for undeveloped
mineral properties, damages the small and medium mining sec-
tor, and discourages exploration activity. It is a recipe for stagna-
tion. On the other hand, completely ignoring economic rents,
while it may be an option for the majority of projects, is bound
to create a political backlash when the proverbial elephant is dis-
covered. In practice, I suspect that the future will develop some-
what along the following lines. A majority of normal projects
will be subject to either a royalty free or a nominal royalty re-
gime with arrangements for projects over a certain threshold,
subject either to special legislation or to a contractual regime.
The integrity of the governing process and the transparency of
such arrangements then becomes absolutely crucial. Therefore,
I expect to see continued international pressure from investors,
financial institutions, and overseas governments to deal with the
corruption problems that regrettably still exist in many coun-
tries.
19971]
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C. The Environment
My third observation is that international environmental is-
sues will become ever more significant in the years ahead. These
issues involve a complex interaction of technical, legal, and eco-
nomic considerations. At the heart of the technical debate is a
divide between regulations that mandate specific processes and
procedures and those that are more flexible and mandate in-
stead specific outcomes, leaving companies to achieve these in
whatever way they like. The key characteristic that differentiates
mining from most other industries in this debate is that each
mine-site is unique in terms of its physical characteristics. It is
virtually impossible to specify processes and procedures that will
be cost-effective in all cases. Thus, the mining industry very
strongly prefers regulations that specify outcomes.
This, however, opens up significant potential problems. For
example, at the Ok Tedi copper mine in Papua New Guinea, the
company's original plan was to construct a tailings dam5 to con-
tain the waste product from its copper concentrating operation.
When the company encountered difficulties in building this fa-
cility, it persuaded the Papua New Guinea government (which as
a significant minority stockholder had an obvious conflict of in-
terest) to abandon the tailings pond and allow it to discharge
waste material directly into a nearby river. Subsequently, it
emerged that this practice had caused serious damage to the
coastal fishing industry in the region. The company then had to
contend with litigation brought not in Papua New Guinea, but in
the Australian courts. Apart from the obvious confusion be-
tween specifying a technical solution and specifying a physical
result, this case vividly illustrates that compliance with local laws
and agreements is not necessarily an adequate business strategy.
Another twist in the complexity of environmental regula-
tion is the potential exposure of lenders to liability if a mining
project fails and leaves an environmental mess. During financial
reorganization or bankruptcy proceedings, lenders may have ef-
fective control of operating decisions. As a result, they may be-
come liable for both past and present pollution. From a more
practical standpoint, lenders usually represent people with
5. See Van E. Housman, Hazardous Waste from Mining: Federal Securities and Exchange
Commission Disclosure Requirements, 1 EN rL. LAw. 793, 796 (1996) (defining tailings.
dams as unlined surface impoundments that collect mining waste).
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"deep pockets" in these situations. Thus, in countries where the
government lacks the technical and financial resources to specify
and enforce adequate environmental controls, lenders are in-
creasingly insisting on environmental regimes that are "up to
best industrial practices." While such a development is obviously
welcome in the sense that it will discourage unsound practices
that may be tolerated by governments that are either unaware of
their consequences or corruptly turning a blind eye, it is a prac-
tice that is fraught with danger. Banks themselves have an obvi-
ous conflict of interest. Their first priority is to insure that the
project has a cash flow to repay its loan, whereas better environ-
mental standards almost always involve increased capital outlays
and sometimes higher operating costs. Then the question arises
as to whose environmental standards are state-of-the-art - those
of the United States, Japan, or Europe? All are different. These
differences can have a material impact on the technologies se-
lected, the environmental outcomes that occur and, above all,
on the costs involved.
On the economic front, an issue of growing importance and
complexity is the affordability of specific environmental regimes.
It is the old ninety-ten rule - ninety percent of the cost is in the
last ten percent of the problem. In my experience, very little
constructive dialogue takes place on this subject. Environmen-
talists frequently take extreme positions that contemplate zero
pollution. The business community responds by resorting to
political lobbying stressing the tax and job benefits of develop-
ment. Some years ago, my consulting company tried offering
mining companies and governments a methodology for under-
standing the affordability of different environmental regimes so
that the decision-makers could better understand the trade-offs
between a cleaner environment and the benefit of the develop-
ment in question. We experienced a very disappointing re-
sponse. The current developing country government approach
is apparently to invite mining companies and financial institu-
tions to tell them what the rules should be, and they will then
pass the necessary legislation. This approach might not be quite
as bad as it sounds if the mining industry had a stronger self-
regulatory culture. Although the most responsible transnational
companies have talked from time-to-time about a peer-enforced
code of practice, the industry's efforts do not compare well with
1997]
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those of other environmentally sensitive sectors such as the
chemical and nuclear power industries.
The present situation is profoundly unsatisfactory. Environ-
mental standards remain uneven around the world, regulations
often fail to recognize the unique problems of individual mine
settings, the legal framework is still in flux, and an objective anal-
ysis of affordability and the related test of cost efficiency is
largely neglected. With environmental issues becoming more
global, as the climate change debate illustrates, I believe that
these issues will become progressively more troublesome in the
yeas ahead.
D. Privatization
My final observation is that the widespread international
trend to privatization seems firmly entrenched. The mining in-
dustry is particularly dependent on certain infrastructure serv-
ices, most notably transportation and electric power, which in
the past have been either regulated or government monopolies.
Because mining, smelting, and refining companies operate in a
commodity market setting, they are not uncomfortable with a
deregulated market for inputs, and in many ways welcome it.
However, as the saying goes, "the devil is in the details." Here I
would like to illustrate some problems and pitfalls by reference
to electricity, which is a particularly important input in the con-
version of ores to marketable metals.
There is an emerging international consensus that the tradi-
tional electricity utility really is three separate businesses -
power generation, transmission, and retail distribution. It is gen-
erally recognized that the generating business is one that is suita-
ble for private investment and competition. After all, an elec-
tron is the ultimate non-differentiated commodity. On the other
hand, transmission is still seen as a natural monopoly which
must therefore be regulated. As far as the distribution business
is concerned, there is less consensus. Nevertheless, industrial
customers with loads of five megawatts to ten megawatts or
greater who can take power at the transmission voltage are in-
creasingly being allowed to enter the wholesale market and con-
tract directly with generators for supply. The vast majority of
mining and metals operations meet these requirements.
Unfortunately there are currently a number of obstacles
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which inhibit the emergence of effective competition and, there-
fore, prevent major customers from realizing the full benefits.
First, in a number of cases privatization has not created a suffi-
cient number of significant players in the market. The U.K.
privatization created two dominant generators whose size greatly
exceeded those of a limited number of smaller competitors. By
contrast, ira the Australian state of Victoria, a much smaller econ-
omy, the government created seven separate generating compa-
nies of approximately equal size. Victorian wholesale prices have
fallen thirty percent since deregulation, a much more pro-
nounced benefit to customers than has occurred in the United
Kingdom.
Second, some electric utilities have assets whose earnings
potential under market clearing prices in a competitive com-
modity market are insufficient for them to recover their histori-
cal capital cost. In may instances this reflects past construction
cost overruns for various reasons. The electric utility industry
refers to these as "stranded assets." This concept is entirely for-
eign to the natural resources sector where it is as usual for some
investments to produce non-existent returns as it is for others to
yield windfall economic rents. In the former case the assets are
either abandoned if they cannot earn any return at all, or else
their capital value is written down to a level that can be sup-
ported by earnings in the competitive market. The electric util-
ity industry, however, persists in seeking what amounts to a gov-
ernment bail-out through mechanisms such as exit fees, trans-
mission surcharges, or other devices, the effect of which is to
restrict competition.
Third, the regulation and management of the transmission
system can be used to blunt the impact of competition by impos-
ing unrealistic charges based on costs that do not really exist.
This is a very complex topic worthy of a separate paper in its own
right but, basically, the laws of physics dictate how power will
flow into the electricity network and these flows will, in most
cases, be quite separate from the contractual relationships. To
put it more simply, the laws of physics insure that whenever a
generator and a customer make an agreement, a whole series of
physical swaps takes place among such other generators and cus-
tomers on the network as are required to minimize the transpor-
tation costs of the system as a whole, regardless of whether or not
any of those other players wish to participate in these swap activi-
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ties. The "cost" associated with a new supplier and a new cus-
tomer is therefore the marginal incremental cost to the network
as a whole. Unless the network is congested, these costs are vir-
tually nil. When you hear electric utilities or regulators talking
about "postage stamp rates" for transmission, you know that
either they do not understand the economics or the physics of
the wholesale power market or, more likely, it is a code word for
a desire to blunt competition. After all, the post office is hardly
a stellar example of competitive efficacy.
The current trend to privatization and deregulation,
whether of electric utilities or other essential services, is wel-
comed by the natural resources sector in that it brings the disci-
pline of the market place to bear and should result in lower costs
for essential inputs. The natural resources sector is ultimately,
however, a customer for these services. A deregulation process
that is poorly or deceptively implemented does not serve the in-
dustry well. Apart from denying the industry the benefits which
should accrue, such a process will inevitably backfire. The dan-
ger is that a failure of deregulation to produce the advertised
benefits will usher in a new phase of interventionist government
during which the natural resources industry may once again ex-
perience some of the difficulties of the quarter century that
ended in 1989.
CONCLUSION
I have attempted to highlight the dominant strategic
themes that I believe will characterize the natural resource in-
dustry as we enter the new century. It should be a period of
solid underlying growth for mineral demand, although I am sure
that periodic interruptions reflecting the usual cycles in the
world economy will occur. Against this market background, the
industry will be dealing with a number of unresolved issues from
the late twentieth century, of which the taxation of economic
rents, the cost-effectiveness of environmental regulations, and
the impact of privatization and deregulation on the competitive
cost structure of the industry appear to be the most important. I
believe that the companies that correctly understand and man-
age these issues will be more likely to succeed than those who do
not.
